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Résumé:  Cet article analyse le rôle de l'assurance privée dans la prévention et la réduction des 
dommages des catastrophes naturelles. Nous caractérisons le dilemme équité-efficacité auquel 
sont confrontés les décideurs politiques dans un contexte d'information imparfaite sur les 
coûts individuels de prévention. Il est montré qu'un marché concurrentiel d'assurance avec 
une tarification actuarielle, associé à des transferts sous forme de taxe ou de subvention, 
domine vraisemblablement les règles de tarification uniforme de l'assurance ou les schémas 
d'indemnisation financée par l'Etat. Le modèle montre comment des taxes différentiées sur les 
contrats d'assurance peuvent accroître les incitations à la prévention, tout en faisant bénéficier 
d'un transfert compensateur les individus dont les coûts de prévention sont élevés. L'article 
met aussi l'accent sur la complémentarité entre les incitations individuelles par la fiscalité et 
les incitations collectives par l'attribution de subventions aux collectivités locales qui mettent 
en place des politiques de prévention des risques de catastrophes naturelles. 
 
Abstract:  This paper investigates the role of private insurance in the prevention and mitigation of 
natural disasters. We characterize the equity-efficiency trade-off faced by the policymakers 
under imperfect information about individual prevention costs. It is shown that a competitive 
insurance market with actuarial ratemaking and compensatory tax-subsidy transfers is likely 
to dominate regulated uniform insurance pricing rules or state-funded assistance schemes. The 
model illustrates how targeted tax cuts on insurance contracts can improve the incentives to 
prevention, while compensating the individuales with high prevention costs. The paper also 
highlights the complementarity between individual incentives through tax cuts and collective 
incentives through grants to the local jurisdictions where risk management plans are enforced. 
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1 Ecole Polytechnique et HEC School of Management. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The last decades have witnessed the worlwide increasing frequency and inten-
sity of weather-related disasters. Windstorms, typhoons, ﬂoods, landslides
and heatwaves were more and more frequent and we have experienced an up-
ward trend in economic losses due to weather disasters, and an even stronger
increase in insured losses. These events may be the prelude to a still more
critical evolution in the future insofar as climate change seems to play a ma-
jor role in this evolution1. Mitigating the consequences of natural disasters
should thus be ranked as a top priority in many industrialised countries and
considered as an issue of the utmost importance for economic development
and poverty reduction.
What can be the contribution of insurance to the management of natural
hazards? In addition to risk pooling within a portfolio of insurance poli-
cies or risk spreading through reinsurance, cat bonds or other alternative
risk transfer mechanisms, the insurance industry can help governments to
create the right incentives for the mitigation of natural hazards. First, in-
surers may help assessing risks and providing information on risk exposure
to individuals, corporations and governments themselves. Insurers can also
convey incentives for prevention through price signals. This may be done by
charging risk-adjusted insurance premiums for property insurance or busi-
ness interruption insurance, in order to discourage the development of new
housing or productive investment in hazard-prone areas. or to incite prop-
erty developers to comply with building codes. Likewise, insurers may oﬀer
attractive peril-crop insurance at aﬀordable price for farming practices able
to withstand climate instability (e.g. when farmers plant drought-resistant
crop varieties).
However, using insurance pricing to mitigate natural disasters is not an
easy task. First, individuals may prefer to rely on post disaster assistance
from governments or NGOs rather than paying an insurance premium to
protect themselves against the consequences of natural hazards2. Secondly,
1The Munich Re data base (Hoﬀ et alii (2003); Munich Re (2005)) shows that the
economic losses resulting from great weather disasters have increased by a factor of more
than six when comparing the last ten years with the sixties, while the insured losses have
been multiplied by ten. The number of reported small and mid-sized disasters reveals a
similar trend.
2See Lewis and Nickerson (1989) and Coate (1995) on the economic incentives generated
by public insurance for natural disasters.
3property owners may not purchase disaster insurance because they under-
estimate their true loss probability3. Thirdly, lower income consumers have
diﬃculty aﬀording insurance, and of course this obstacle is particularly im-
portant in developing countries. Fourthly, because of adverse selection the
burden may be concentrated on high risk individuals which makes it even
heavier.
It is nevertheless particularly important to explore this path, since it uses
the forces of economic incentives, which often prove to be much more eﬀective
and less costly than a command and control approach. Having said that,
we face a fundamental problem. On the one hand, insurance may provide
incentives by charging actuarial premiums. By doing so, insurers encourage
the agents from the private sector to internalize the cost of natural disasters in
their cost-beneﬁt analysis - especially in the case of a new investment project.
As we will see, insurance pricing may also indirectly incite communities (e.g.
municipalities) to take adequate mitigation measures. On the other hand,
fairness issues are particularly relevant for natural disasters insurance pricing
: indeed many individuals are not in position to reduce their risk exposure
at reasonable cost and for them insurance premiums are analogous to a lump
sum tax, without any signiﬁcant incentive eﬀect.
H e n c ei n c e n t i v e sc o m ei n t oc o n ﬂict with equity (or fairness). Providing
incentives to prevention and mitigation militates in favour of actuarial in-
surance pricing, but competitive insurance may be a too heavy burden for
the ones who live and work in vulnerable situation without any possibility of
reducing their risk exposure at a reasonable cost.
The trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency is the heart of the matter
and we will analyse this dilemma in what follows. The starting point is
a simple model of a regulated insurance market drawn from Latruﬀea n d
Picard (2004). In this model, prevention costs are supposed to be private
information to the individuals4. The insurance market is competitive but the
3Kunreuther (1984),(1996) emphasizes the fact that individuals are reluctant to pur-
chase ﬂood insurance because they misperceive the ﬂood peril. Browne and Hoyt (2000)
study the determinants of the demand for ﬂo o di n s u r a n c ei nt h eU Sw i t h i nt h eN a t i o n a l
Flood Insurance Program. They ﬁnd that the number of ﬂood insurance policies sold
during the current period is positively correlated with ﬂood losses during the prior pe-
riod, which conﬁrms that perceptions of the ﬂood risk are an important determinant of
insurance purchases.
4The equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ exists insofar as prevention and mitigation costs are
unknown or at least imperfectly known to the government. If these costs were perfectly
veriﬁable, then tailor-made incentive mechanisms could be designed to compensate the in-
4g o v e r n m e n tm a ye i t h e rl e v yt a x e so ni n surance contracts or subsidize these
contracts according to the risk exposure. Section 2 focuses on individual
prevention decision. It shows that there exists a trade-oﬀ between equity (or
equality in the burden of natural disasters) and incentives (or eﬃciency in risk
prevention) : providing more incentives to prevention leads to less equality
between individuals. However, this Section also establishes a condition under
which a competitive equilibrium with risk categorization and tax-subsidy
transfers Pareto-dominates uniform pricing5. Under this condition, the gains
from prevention associated with competitive insurance allows the government
to compensate the individuals whose risk exposure remains high, so that
nobody loses when we go from uniform pricing to competitive pricing. In
other words, even if the government cannot use tailor-made compensatory
mechanisms because of imperfect information on individual prevention costs,
it is nevertheless a fact that risk categorization with a compensatory tax-
subsidy schedule may be attractive for everybody. This will be the case if
there is a substantial proportion of high risk individuals with low prevention
costs. Section 2 provides some tentative estimates that suggest that the
condition for a competitive equilibrium to be welfare enhancing is empirically
plausible. Section 3 focuses on the preventive actions by local authorities in
the form of risk management plans (e.g. ﬂoodplain management ordinances
to reduce future ﬂood damages). These plans aﬀect the likelihood of suﬀering
a natural disaster and they are a determining factor of the actuarial premiums
charged by property insurers. It is assumed that the central government has
imperfect information on the cost of local risk management plans as well as
on individual prevention costs. Taxes and subsidies distort the choice made
by local authorities and the outcome is only a second-best Pareto-optimum
although it is improved by incentive contracts between local governments and
the central government6. It is shown that risk categorization and competitive
dividuals who have to pay large premiums because they cannot reduce their risk exposure.
5In some European countries, natural disaster insurance is highly regulated and insurers
are not allowed to charge risk-adjusted premiums. In particular in France the coverage of
natural catastrophes is statutorily included in property policies on payment of a percentage
premium surcharge. Natural disaster insurance is provided in Spain by a state monopoly,
the Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros and in Switzerland through cantonal insurers.
On the contrary, Germany, Italy, Poland and United Kingdom rely on private property
insurance markets, but the penetration rates remain low in these countries.
6These dual contractual relationships beween insurers and insureds on one side and
between local communities and the Federal government on the other side are the core
of the National Flood Insurance Program established by the US Congress in 1968 and
5insurance lead to more eﬃcient decisions by local governments than in the
case of uniform insurance pricing, which highlights the complementary roles
of insurance markets and local risk management plans in the prevention and
the mitigation of natural disasters. Section 4 concludes.
2E q u i t y a n d e ﬃciency in natural disaster in-
surance
2.1 The model
Consider a risk of natural disaster in a country with two types of areas. Some
inhabitants live in high risk areas where the probability of a natural disaster
is πH and the other ones are in low risk areas, with a disaster probability
πL,w i t h0< πL < πH < 1. The fraction of individuals initially located
in a high risk area is λ,w i t h0< λ < 1. For notational simplicity, we
assume that all individuals suﬀe rt h es a m el o s sA in case of a natural disaster.
W denotes their initial wealth which is also the same for everybody. The
individuals who are living in high risk areas may reduce their risk by moving
to a low risk area, which costs them c. The prevention cost c is diﬀerentiated
among the inhabitants of the high risk areas and it is private information to
each individual : c is distributed over [0,+∞) according to the density f(c)
and cumulative distribution function F(c). Inhabitants are expected utility
maximizers and they display risk aversion with respect to their ﬁnal wealth
Wf. Their von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is written as u(Wf),
with u0 > 0a n du00 < 0.
Natural disaster insurance contracts specify the premium P and the in-
demnity I paid in case of a natural disaster. If no prevention cost has been
incurred, we have Wf = W −P if no disaster occurs and Wf = W −A−P +I
in case of a disaster. If the individual has gone from a high risk area to a
low risk area to reduce the risk exposure, then Wf = W − A − P + I − c or
Wf = W − P − c according to whether a disaster occurs or not.
We assume that the insurance market is competitive, with no transaction
costs and risk neutral insurers. The government may tax or subsidize insur-
ance contracts diﬀerently according to the risk exposure. Let tL be the lump
managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. See FEMA (2005). In a very
abstract way, the model of Section 3 may be viewed as a theoretical schematisation of this
system.
6sum tax in a low risk area and let tH be the lump sum subsidy in a high risk
area. Note that tL and tH are independent from the prevention cost c since it
cannot be observed by the government. In words, case by case tailored-made
transfers are not feasible. Given that individuals are risk averse and in the
absence of transaction costs, competition leads insurers to oﬀer contracts
PL,I L in low risk areas and PH,I H in high risk areas, with actuarial premi-
ums PL = πLIL + tL, PH = πHIH − tH and full coverage IL = IH = A.W e
thus have
PL = πLA + tL (1)
PH = πHA − tH (2)
which means that the insurance premium is equal to the actuarial premium
πLA or πHA increased by the tax tL or reduced by the subsidy tH.
2.2 Uniform insurance pricing
We may ﬁrst compute the tax and subsidy that would lead to complete
equality between individuals : they would pay the same premium whatever
their risk exposure, that is PL = PH. I ns u c hac a s e ,t h e r ei sn oi n c e n t i v e
to prevention and the proportion of individuals who live in a high risk area
remains equal to λ. The government budget constraint requires that taxes
paid in low risk areas are equal to subsidies paid in high risk areas, which
gives λtH =( 1− λ)tL.U s i n gPL = PH then gives
tH =( 1 − λ)(πH − πL)A ≡ t
∗
H
tL = λ(πH − πL)A ≡ t
∗
L
while the insurance premium (the same in all areas whatever the risk expo-
sure) is
P
∗ =[ λπH +( 1− λ)πL]A (3)
Hence the insurance premium is the actuarial premium computed with the
average disaster probability λπH +(1−λ)πL. Insureds are fully covered and
their ﬁnal wealth is Wf = W − P∗ and insurers charge P∗ whatever the
risk exposure. In fact there is no need to levy taxes and to grant subsidies
to reach this goal : all the government has to do is to prohibit categorical
discrimination in insurance pricing. This is also equivalent to a state-funded
7assistance sheme in which the government would use its own resources to
pay indemnities to the victims of natural disasters, without any role for the
private insurance sector.
Let Pmax be the maximum premium that low risk individuals are ready
to pay for full coverage. Pmax is deﬁned by
(1 − πL)u(W)+πLu(W − A)=u(W − Pmax).
Obviously P∗ may be larger than Pmax. In such a case, if low risk individuals
have the choice, they would prefer to stay uninsured rather than purchasing
insurance at price P∗ In other words, the viability of the uniform pricing
regime requires insurance to be compulsory, for otherwise low risk individual
may prefer to opt out.
2.3 The equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ
From now on, we assume that natural disater insurance is compulsory for all
property owners, but some degree of categorical discrimination is enforced.
Individuals living in a high risk area would consider going to a low risk area
(or they may take any other prevention measure) if the decrease in the
insurance premium is larger than the prevention cost, that is if
PH − PL >c
or equivalently, given (1) and (2), if c<c ∗ where
c
∗ =( πH − πL)A − (tL + tH). (4)
c∗ is a threshold : the individuals with a prevention cost lower than c∗ leave
the high risk area in which they were living to go to a low risk area. Con-
sequently, the proportion of individuals who are in low risk areas comes up
to 1 − λ + λF(c∗). Note that the maximization of aggregate wealth would
require migration from high risk areas to low risk areas when c<c ∗∗ where
c∗∗ =( πH − πL)A.( 4 )s h o w st h a tc∗ <c ∗∗ when tL + tH > 0:t h ec o m p e n -
satory tax-subsidy shedule induces distortions in prevention by comparison
with a non-regulated insurance market.
Let us start from the status quo situation where all individuals pay the
same premium P∗. The tax - subsidy mechanism will be Pareto-improving
if three conditions are fulﬁlled.
81. We should have PH <P ∗,o re q u i v a l e n t l ytH ≥ t∗
H, so that individuals
who continue living in a high risk area are not penalized. Note that this
condition implies that the individuals who leave the high risk areas end up
better oﬀ (they have the possibility to stay in the high risk areas after all!).
2. We should have PL <P ∗ ,o re q u i v a l e n t l ytL ≤ t∗
L, so that individuals
who were already living in a low risk area are not penalized either.
3. Finally, the government budget constraint is written as
tH [λ(1 − F(c
∗)] = tL [1 − λ + λF(c
∗)]. (5)
which means that the income from taxes is equal to subsidies.
Let us write tH = t∗
H + k where k denotes the increase in the subsidy
to insurance contracts in high risk areas, by comparison with the status quo





∗ − k (6)
Equation (6) yields a relationship between tL and c∗ for a given k.I t c o r -
respond to the migration equilibrium from high risk areas to low risk areas:
more risk prevention (hence a larger threshold c∗)r e q u i r e sal o w e rt a xr a t e
on insurance contract in low risk areas, for a given subsidization in high risk
areas (i.e. for a given k). In Figure 1, the migration equilibrium is repre-
sented by decreasing straight lines ME with slope equal to one in absolute
value. Using (5) allows us to rewrite the government budget constraint as
tL =
λ(t∗
H + k)[1 − F(c∗)]
1 − λ + λF(c∗)
. (7)
This equation provides another relationship between the prevention threshold
c∗ and the tax rate rate in low risk area tL,f o rag i v e nk. The more intense
the prevention, the smaller the proportion of individuals in high risk areas
and thus the smaller the tax that has to be levied in these areas to cover
the subsidies paid in high risk areas. The government budget constraint is
represented by the non-linear decreasing curves GBC in Figure 17.I nb r i e f ,
a budget balanced tax-subsidy policy is characterized by tL and c∗ such that
7As u ﬃcient condition for the GBC curves to be convex is that F(c) is (weakly) concave,
i.e. f(c) is non-increasing. However, the results are independent from the convexity of
these curves.
9equations (6) and (7) are satisﬁed, for a given k. Such a policy Pareto-
dominates the uniform insurance pricing policy without prevention if k ≥ 0
(or equivalently tH ≥ t∗
H)a n dtL ≤ t∗
L, one (at least) of these inequalities
being strictly satisﬁed.
In Figure 1, the lines in bold correspond to k = 0. Then the migration
equilibrium and the government budget constraint are satisﬁed at a status
quo state tL = t∗
L,c ∗ =0:t h i si sp o i n tA in the ﬁgure. It corresponds to uni-
form insurance pricing: all individuals pay the same premium P∗ whatever
their risk exposure. However, Figure 1 shows that the two equilibrium condi-
tions may also be satisﬁed at another point (denoted by C), with c∗ = c∗
0 > 0
and tL = tL0 <t ∗
L: this new equilibrium is strictly preferred to the status
quo equilibrium by the individuals who are in a low risk area (possibly after
migration) while the other ones are indiﬀerent between the two equilibria.
When we go from A to C,t h et a xc u tt∗
L− tL0 induces the relocation of a frac-
tion λF(c∗
0) of the population from high risk areas to low risk areas and the
corresponding surplus allows the government to keep its budget balanced,
without any change in the subsidies granted to the insurance contracts in
high risk areas.
As u ﬃcient condition for such a Pareto-dominating equilibrium to exist
is that at point A the slope (in absolute value) of the GBC curve is larger
than one. A simple computation shows that this will be the case when
λ >
1
1+( πH − πL)Af(0)
(8)
Condition (8) is satisﬁed when the fraction of individuals living in risky areas
is large enough and when a substantial number of these individuals have low
prevention costs. Mathematically speaking, the larger f(0) the lower the λ
threshold for a Pareto improvement to be feasible.
The important question is whether this condition is likely to be satisﬁed
in practice. We will come back to that in a moment. For the time beeing,
assume that condition (8) hold and let’s have a look at the consequences of
an increase in k : how is the (Pareto-dominating) equilibrium changed when
the insurance contracts in high risk areas beneﬁt from a larger subsidy rate.
When k increases, ME shifts downward and GBC shifts upward. When k
is positive but not too large (lower than an upper bound b k),ME and GBC
cross twice, at points D and E, but the Pareto-dominating equilibrium is at
point E. Comparing E and C shows that the increase in k has brought about
10a decrease in c∗ a n da ni n c r e a s ei ntL:p e o p l ei nh i g hr i s ka r e a sa r eb e t t e ro ﬀ
and the ones in low risk areas are worse oﬀ, but there is less risk prevention.
Figure 2 illustrates this trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency. The hor-
izontal axis measures prevention cost c, and the vertical axis measures the
ﬁnal wealth Wf. For the people who are located in a low risk area (possibly
after migration), we have
Wf = W − PL − c = W − P
∗ + t
∗
L − tL(k) − c
with c = 0 if the individual was initially in a low risk area, and tL(k)i st h e
tax rate which is a decreasing function of k with tL(0) = tL0 and tL(b k)=tL1..
For the individuals who stay in a high risk area, we have
Wf = W − PH = W − P
∗ + k.
with the prevention threshold c∗(k)=t∗
L−tL(k)−k. Maximizing aggregate
social welfare would lead to choose k =0 ,s ot h a tp r e v e n t i o ni sa sl a r g e
as possible, while a Rawlsian approach to utilitarianism (Make the poorest
as well oﬀ as possible) would recommend to choose k = b k.T h e t r a d e - o ﬀ
between equity and eﬃciency is pervasive in Economics and the problem of
regulating a market for natural disaster insurance is not an exception to the
rule!
2.4 Improving the trade-oﬀ
Until now we have assumed that all the individuals were indistinguishable
apart from their risk exposure. Suppose on the contrary that individuals can
be categorized in n groups: there is a fraction αi of ”type i individuals”, and
among them a proportion λ
i is initially locatized in a high risk area, with Pn




For example, in the case of ﬂood insurance, we may distinguish new
buildings from old ones and we may also separate regions according to the
frequency of ﬂoods8. In crop insurance, we may categorize farms according
to the type of plants they grow and to their location. The fraction of high
risk individuals and the probability distribution of prevention costs are likely
to diﬀer from one category to the next. In particular, categorization may be
correlated with prevention cost. For example, setting up a new building in an
8This is what is done in the National Flood Insurance Program in the US.
11area far from a river may entail some costs to the newcomers (for example if a
railway line runs alongside the river and makes transportation easier for the
residents or if the river lanscape is particularly pleasant), but these costs are
likely to be lower than for the move of inhabitants who would have to leave
the place in which they settled a long time ago. Likewise, in some geological
environments and for some plants, growing draught-resistant species may not
entail a strong decrease in yield, while the loss is probably substantial under
other conditions. In such cases, the categories are signals on prevention cost
and categorizing the tax-subsidy schedule enhances eﬃciency.
Let ti
H and ti
L be respectively the subsidy and the tax for the insurance
contract in group i. As before, the tax is paid in high risk areas, while the
subsidy is paid in low risk areas. The prevention threshold in group i is thus
c





Let fi(c)a n dFi(c) be respectively the density and the cumulative distri-


























L.( 1 0 )
Let us consider a status quo situation with uniform pricing, no categorization




L and ci∗ =0f o ra l li. Consider a certain
group i and suppose that ti
H is kept equal to t∗
H , which means that type i
individuals in high risk areas are not put at a disadvantage by comparison
with the status quo. We may induce prevention by some of these individuals
(the ones with small prevention costs) by lowering ti
L under t∗
L.O n e c a n





1+( πH − πL)Afi(0)
. (11)
(11) may hold for a subset of groups i in {1,...,n}, even if (8) does not hold,
which shows that categorization enhances eﬃciency9.
9For example, assume that groups are identically distributed among high risk and low
risk areas and that they are ranked according to increasing prevention costs. Ranking




F1(c) >F2(c)... > Fn(c). In such a case, we have f1(0) >f 2(0)... > fn(0). Consequently,
there exist a threshold group i∗ such that (11) hold if and only if i ≤ i∗.
12Another way to improve the trade-oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency is
to categorize the low risk areas. Indeed the incentive power of tax cuts is
larger in the low risk areas that are close to high risk zones than in remote
low risk zones, because it is cheaper to move to the nearby low risk zones.
Categorizing low risk areas may thus improve our trade-oﬀ by targeting tax
cuts.
That may be illustrated as follows. Assume that low risk areas are cate-
gorized in two groups: the low risk areas located nearby high risk areas are
in group 1 and the other ones are in group 2. Hence, we now consider three
types of areas: high risk areas and low risk areas of groups 1 and 2. The
government allocates the tax cuts to group 1. f(c)a n dF(c) still denote the
density and cumulative distribution functions of the prevention cost (the cost
i n d u c e db yam o v e m e n tf r o mah i g hr i s ka r e at oag r o u p1a r e a ) . P o s s i b l e
moves from group 2 to group 1 should also be taken into account because
some individuals initially located in group 2 may choose to move to group 1
in order to beneﬁt from the tax cut. Assume that a fraction µ of the individ-
uals initially located in a low risk area are in a group 1 area and a fraction
1 − µ is in a group 2 area and we denote by g(c)a n dG(c) the density and
cumulative distribution function of the cost incurred by the individuals who
may move from group 2 to group 1. Let tL1 and tL2 be respectively the tax
rate on insurance contracts in the group 1 and group 2 areas. The subsidy
rate in the high risk area is still denoted by tH and we assume tH = t∗
H.T h e
government chooses tL2 = t∗
L since no incentive eﬀect could be expected from
a tax cut in the group 2 area. Individuals in a high risk area or in group 2








H[1 − F(c∗) − (1 − µ)(1 − G(c∗)]
(1 − λ)[µ +( 1− µ)G(c∗)] + λF(c∗)
(13)
(12) and (13) are analogous to (6) and (7), with k = 0. (12) is the migra-
tion equilibrium condition and it is represented in Figure 3 by a decreasing
straight line ME with slope equal to one in absolute value. (13) is the gov-
ernement budget constraint and it correspond to the non linear locus GBC.
10This is pure opportunism (not risk prevention) for the individuals coming from group
2a r e a s .
13The locus in italics is the GBC curve when there is no categorization of low
risk areas, which corresponds to µ = 1: all individuals in the low risk areas
beneﬁts from the tax cut. Categorization lowers the GBC curve and leads to
more prevention : at the crossing between ME and GBC, c∗ is larger under
categorization (at point D) than when there is no categorization (at point C).
Hence categorization of low risk areas enhances the equity-eﬃciency trade-
oﬀ. There is actually risk prevention at equilibrium if the slope of the GBC
curve in absolute value is larger than one. A simple calculation shows that







Condition (14) is an extension of condition (8) to the case where low risk ar-
eas are categorized. When the size of the group 1 areas decreases, µ decreases
and condition (14) is more easily satisﬁed11.
Is condition (14) likely to be satisﬁed in practice? We may calibrate the
parameters of the model to answer this question roughly. Consider the case of
ﬂood insurance, and suppose we target the insurance for new buildings. The
time period is one year. Assume that λ =0 .05,µ =0 .10,πH =0 .10,πL =
0.02. In words, 5% of the population is supposed to be subject to a severe
risk of ﬂood (10% chance per year of beeing the victim of a ﬂood) while the
risk is much lower for 95% of the population (only 2% chance). Furthermore,
0.95 × 10% = 9.5% of the population is initially living in the low risk areas
chosen for tax cuts. A is the value of damaged property in case of ﬂood.
Suppose that the prevention cost is uniformly distributed over an interval
[0,2c], with c the average prevention cost for new buildings. c is the average
additional expenditure per year to escape from the high ﬂood risk. We then
have f(0) = 1/2c. Suppose that on average moving the new building to a
low risk group 1 area entails an additional investment cost I if the prefered
location is in a high risk area. Then we may write c = rI,w h e r er is the






11It is particularly interesting to observe that condition (14) is independent from func-
tions G and g. In other words, the condition for categorization to be welfare improving
does not depend on the distribution of the cost incurred by opportunistic individuals who
may move from a group 2 area to a group 1 area in order to beneﬁtf r o mt h et a xc u t .
14which gives an upper bound for the ratio of the average additional investment
cost over the value of damaged property in case of ﬂood. When r =0 .03,
the condition is I/A < 70% which seems to be highly likely. It would be
hard to believe that ﬂood prevention increases the cost of a new building by
more than 70%! If we take a 5% interest rate, the upper bound on I/A falls
to 42% and it is still likely to be satisﬁed. If the group 1 zone shrinks (µ is
smaller) then the upper bound on I/A is larger.
3P r e v e n t i o n b y c o m m u n i t i e s
Let us now examine the relationship between natural disaster insurance and
prevention by the communities which have authority to adopt and enforce
risk prevention regulations within their jurisdiction. These regulations are
costly to the inhabitants: for example, in the case of a foodplain management
program, being tough on building standards or development permits entails
additional investment costs to the families, property developers and busi-
nesses and ultimately it may bring about a decrease in the price of buildings
plots.
Consider a local authority which may suppress the high risk areas within
its jurisdiction through a risk management plan at cost θ. λ still denotes the
fraction of the population located in a high risk area if there is no prevention
(neither individually by moving to a low risk area, nor collectively through
a risk management plan). The distribution of individual prevention costs is
still described by the density f(c) and the cumulative distribution F(c). If
location decisions were eﬃcient within the jurisdiction, then all individuals
with a prevention cost less than c∗∗ should move to a low risk area. Then
the aggregate expected wealth per inhabitant would be equal to
W − [1 − λ + λF(c





in the absence of a risk management plan, while it becomes
W − πLA − θ (16)
if the risk management plan is adopted. Comparing (15) and (16) shows that
the socially eﬃcient decision rule requires the local authority to adopt the
15risk management plan if θ ≤ Φ(c∗∗), where
Φ(c






Now assume that the local authority adopts the risk management plan only
if it increases the expected wealth of the inhabitants within the jurisdiction,
given the insurance premiums that have to be paid in high risk and low
risk areas12. If the risk management plan is not adopted, then the expected
wealth of the inhabitants is
W − [1 − λ + λF(c






W − PL − θ (18)
if the plan is adopted. Comparing (17) and (18) shows that the plan is
actually adopted if θ ≤ Φ(c∗). Since function Φ is increasing and c∗ <c ∗∗
when tH+tL > 0, we deduce that the decisions of the local authority may not
maximize aggregate social welfare. More explicitly, when Φ(c∗) < θ ≤ Φ(c∗∗),
the risk management plan is not adopted though it should be. In the extreme
case of uniform insurance pricing (i.e. when PL = PH = P∗), we have
c∗ =0a n ds i n c eΦ(0) = 0, it turns out that the plan is never adopted.
In words, when the government enforces compensatory transfers between
insurance contracts, it reduces the incentives of local authorities to adopt
costly prevention measures, and these incentives may even fully vanish when
inhabitants pay the same premium whatever their risk exposure.
If the central government knows θ, then it can induce the local authorities
to adopt the plan when it is optimal to do so. It just needs to pay a subsidy
s(θ)=θ − Φ(c∗)w h e nΦ(c∗) < θ ≤ Φ(c∗∗) conditionally on the plan beeing
adopted, and no subsidy otherwise. Under such a scheme, the plan will be
adopted if and only if θ ≤ Φ(c∗∗).
However, it is very unlikely that the central government knows θ precisely
enough to be able to implement such a scheme. It is much more realistic to
assume that only uniform subsidies (conditional on the plan beeing adopted)
12We could contemplate other decision criterions, such as majority voting among inhab-
itants, without aﬀecting the results qualitatively.
16are available. Suppose that the only diﬀerence between the local jurisdictions
is about the cost of their risk management plan and let H(θ)b et h ec u m u l a -
tive distribution function of θ among jurisdictions. If there is a government
grant s to any local jurisdiction where a risk management plan is adopted,
then such plans will be adopted in any jurisdiction where θ − s ≤ Φ(c∗)
which corresponds to a fraction H(Φ(c∗)+s) of the jurisdictions. Some
simple calculations then lead to write the government budget constraint as
tL =
λ(t∗
H + k)[1 − H(Φ(c∗)+s)][1 − F(c∗)] + H(Φ(c∗)+s)s
[1 − H(Φ(c∗)+s)][1 − λ + λF(c∗)] + H(Φ(c∗)+s)
(19)
which is an extension of (7) to the case where the central governement aﬀects
grants to local authorities. Consider the case where k = 0. Assume ﬁrst that








Equations (7) and (20) are respectively represented by the GBC and GBC0
curves in Figure 4. Comparing (20) with (7) shows that GBC0 is under
GBC. Consequently, under k = s = 0, the second-best Pareto-eﬃcient pre-
vention cost threshold increases from c∗
0 to c∗0
0 . If local authorities adopt risk
management plans, then the overall proportion of high risk areas decreases
and, for unchanged subsidies t∗
H paid in high risk areas, the tax burden per
insured is lighter in low risk areas, which reinforces the incentive to move
to these areas. In other words, individual prevention and collective preven-
tion by local authorities strengthen together. Providing individual incentives
through diﬀerenciated insurance pricing incites local authorities to adopt risk
management plans. Inversely, these plans reduce the tax burden in high risk
areas which stimulates individuals prevention decisions.
The GBC00 curve represents equation (19) when s is positive. When s is
not too large, then GBC00 is under GBC0 and it leads to an even larger pre-
vention threshold c∗00
0 . In words, if the central government aims at maximizing
prevention without putting the individuals with high prevention costs at a
disadvantage (that is by choosing k = 0), then it should provide incentives
to individual prevention through tax cuts on insurance contract in targeted
low risk areas and simultaneously it should grant subsidies to local jurisdic-
tions where risk management plans are enforced. Both mechanisms are not
substitutable: they are complementary and their incentive power intensify
one another.
174C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has investigated the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ in the regulation
of natural disaster insurance. This trade-oﬀ follows from the imperfect ob-
servability of prevention cost. The regulator is then unable to implement
tailor-made compensatory transfers between high cost and low cost individ-
uals. For the sake of simplicity, we have focused on the prevention of natural
disaster, but the same logic is at work in the case of mitigation. It can be
summarized in a few words. Inducing more prevention or more mitigation
through insurance requires that risk-based premiums are charged by insurers.
This inevitably penalizes the individuals who cannot escape risk at reason-
able cost. The regulator is thus confronted with a dilemma between sharing
the burden of natural disaster risks in a more egalitarian way in a Rawlsian
perspective and improving the eﬃciency of risk reduction incentives.
Several results emerge from our analysis of this equity-eﬃciency trade-
oﬀ. Firstly, uniform insurance pricing is likely to be Pareto-dominated by
risk-based pricing with an adequate transfer schedule. Secondly, the govern-
ment can improve the trade-oﬀ by categorizing individuals or areas. Thirdly,
actuarial insurance pricing urges local communities to implement costly risk
management programs, but compensatory taxes and subsidies chosen by the
central government induce distortions in local decision-making. Therefore, it
is socially useful to pay conditional grants to the local communities that get
involved in such programs.
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